The emergence of water markets has heralded the prospect of increased efficiency in the use of the resource for extractive purposes such as irrigated agriculture.
Water allocation
The processes by which Australia's water resources are allocated have undergone fundamental changes over the last two decades. The centralised, command and control process of allocating water extraction licences to specific parcels of land has begun to give way to a more decentralised, market-based approach. This has been achieved in the lower, regulated, reaches of rivers primarily through defining property rights to water as separate from land title. It has also been driven by the defining (quantification and separation) of rights to harvest water in the upper, unregulated reaches of river systems and the phasing in of competitive water supply practices (including pricing) by state government authorities under the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) water reform agreement. The result has been the development of markets in which temporary and permanent licences to extract can be transferred.
With the formation of water markets, competitive pressures have resulted in higher prices for water, relative to the effective prices implicit in the licence fees previously fixed by government fiat. Licence transfers have seen water reallocated from lower to higher value uses (for instance, irrigated pasture to vineyards). The higher water prices -together with technological advances -have resulted in increased substitution of capital for water (for instance, the introduction of computer monitored drip irrigation systems in place of flood irrigation techniques). In other words, the efficiency of water for extractive use has improved.
Water and the environment
Whilst far from complete, the reforms underpinning the growth of water markets have already demonstrated the power of market forces to generate improvements in social welfare relative to the command and control alternative. These improvements have, however, all been enjoyed in the use of water to provide private goods, notably irrigated produce. Greater and more valuable output is being created with the same amount of water. For such output, the price signals sent by the water market trigger the profit motive to individuals and that in turn motivates efficient resource use in both the static and dynamic sense.
Water does more than act as an input in the production of marketed goods. Amongst an array of other uses, it is consumed directly, acts as a waste sink, is the focus of recreational and tourist interest and it provides for and is a component of ecosystems that in themselves are valuable to people for numerous reasons. In many cases, the use of water for extractive purposes carries with it an opportunity cost of the foregone benefits associated with these alternative uses. For instance, the storing of water its later release to irrigate cotton crops may mean that bird-breeding events in downstream wetlands are either not triggered to begin or prematurely terminated because water levels drop below a threshold level necessary to keep breeding pairs at the nesting site.
Many of the non-extractive, environmental water uses such as habitat maintenance and aesthetic beauty are non-excludable and/or joint in consumption. It is unlikely that they will be supplied to their socially optimal level given the current structure of water rights and hence water markets. Their non-excludability under current definitions of property rights gives rise to free rider problems. The transaction costs for a profit motivated person seeking to buy water rights in order to supply environmental benefits will more than likely swamp any potential profits from sales. The large number of potential beneficiaries and the costs associated with searching for them provide an immediate obstacle to potential profit motivated private suppliers. Even more limiting are the costs of preventing non-paying users of the environmental goods taking advantage of their provision. Furthermore, some government imposed restrictions on the operation of water markets, such as limitations on who can own what rights to water, are barriers even to non-profit private suppliers.
Recognising these limitations, governments have introduced policies to ensure the supply of environmental benefits from water flows. Most commonly, they have quarantined from the market allocation process, a proportion of water flows in rivers. These are usually known as 'environmental flows'. So whilst water markets are allowed to operate for flows that have been designated for extractive purposes, environmental flows are not available for trade and are generally managed by state government agencies.
Determining environmental flows
Setting the amount of water to be allocated as an environmental flow presents numerous challenges to policy makers and their advisers. Ideally from an economic efficiency perspective, the environmental flow for each river should be set so that the benefits generated from an additional megalitre allocated to the environment are equal to the marginal costs. From another perspective, river flows should be allocated to extractive uses such as irrigated agriculture until the marginal benefits so created fall to equal the marginal environmental costs such allocations cause. Whilst the market can ensure that the extractive uses of water are 'ranked' according to the marginal value they create in the water allocation 'queue', the cut off point where the marginal environmental costs exceed these benefits is not signalled.
Various processes have been instigated by governments to set this threshold. The most widely visible process was that by which the Victorian and New South Wales Governments decided to allocate water to restoring flows in the Snowy River rather than divert it through the Snowy Mountains Hydro Electricity Scheme and onto the Murray and Murrumbidgee Rivers for use in irrigated agriculture. That process involved the formation of a formal commission of inquiry. Under that inquiry (Snowy Water Inquiry, 1998) , extensive modelling of flows and their resultant impacts on the value of hydropower generation and irrigation was undertaken. In addition, assessments of the environmental condition of the Snowy River, both as it is and how it would be under different scenarios of flow conditions were carried out along with some rudimentary estimation of the values the community placed on the changes in environmental condition.
In addition, individual State Governments have sought to set environmental flow targets through the inception of various water management plans, river management plans and catchment management plans. A feature of most of the processes used to develop these plans is community consultation. Advisory committees made up of representatives of extractive user groups (for instance, Irrigator Councils), conservation groups (eg. ACF, WWF-sometimes local, otherwise from the state capital city) and other locals join with delegates from the state government resource management agencies (Agriculture, EPA, Land and Water). These committees generally perform an advisory role to the relevant State Government Minister.
The transaction costs imposed by the 'community consultation' process are significant not only in terms of the resources devoted to public hearings, committee meetings etc. but also in terms of the conflict they can cause within communities. Furthermore, there is little to guarantee that the outcome of the process will provide outcomes that are in the best interest of society at large. Firstly, the composition of the committees is unlikely to be 'representative'. Committee members are appointed by the relevant Minister and are hence likely to be chosen on the basis of their pre-disposition to certain outcomes. However they are also self-selecting in offering their services and hence self-interested. Individuals on the committees are given an opportunity to pursue their individual goals and ministers in appointing members are given the opportunity to meet their own goals. The recipe is one ideal that is prone to rent seeking. Governments have the power to confer rents on extractive users by allocating them more water (or at least not taking away as much water as they may otherwise do). They also have the power to confer rents to those who enjoy the environmental values of rivers by increasing environmental flows.
Current debates regarding property rights over resources such as water and native vegetation in rural Australia are fundamentally about this process: Competing demand interests are jostling for government supplies of rent streams.
Consistent with other demonstrations of rent seeking, it is unlikely that the best interests of society at large will be served. Considerations of equating marginal social benefits and marginal social costs are likely to be swamped by political considerations. The Snowy River decision is illustrative. One interpretation of the final decision that was taken in that case is that it was more determined by the fate of one marginal seat in the Victorian Parliament than any of the information put together during the Snowy Water Inquiry.
Benefits and Costs
What then can economics offer to help prevent the consequences of rent seeking behaviour? The fundamental answer is information. With better information regarding the nature, extent and distribution of the marginal benefits and costs of alternative water policy outcomes, people are better able to recognise the consequences of decisions that may be driven by rent seeking rather than the maximisation of social welfare.
The benefits of extractive uses of water are relatively straightforward to estimate. Extractive uses generate surpluses for buyers and sellers of final products through market transactions. Reference to market data allows the estimation of changes in consumers' and producers' surpluses 1 .
1 That is not to understate the complexity of the estimation process. The information provided by markets is far from complete. For instance, the market prices of agricultural products are often distorted by intervention both domestically and internationally. In addition, inappropriate value estimation procedures can be employed. An example of this is the use of expenditure multipliers as the basis for the calculation of 'spill-over' benefits arising from irrigated agriculture (Powell, 1996) . Such multipliers relate to the extent of expenditure resulting from activities and not newly created surpluses.
More problematic is the estimation of the non-market values associated with the environmental benefits of water use. Without recourse to market data on these benefits, their estimation in monetary terms to enable a direct comparison with the marketed extractive use values presents a stumbling block to economic analysis. The challenge to economists has been the development of techniques to generate dollar value estimates where no directly relevant market data are available.
Non-market Valuation
Two broad types of valuation techniques have been developed to meet this challenge: revealed preference techniques and stated preference techniques.
Revealed preference techniques rely on data on people's preferences for a nonmarketed good or service that are revealed in markets for specifically related goods and services. Hence, markets for residential property may be used to estimate the aesthetic value of a river that flows through an urban environment through the application of the hedonic pricing technique 2 . Furthermore, the value of rivers as the sites for recreational pursuits can be estimated using the travel cost method. Under this technique, the complementary relationship between peoples' expenditures on travel and their use of recreational sites is exploited to infer monetary values for those sites 3 .
Revealed preference techniques are limited. They are only capable of estimating the values of changes that relate to past experience. Where a new set of circumstances arise in the context of a resource management issue, no related market data covering the event will be available. Similarly, the techniques cannot be applied when the environmental good or service under consideration has no related goods that are marketed. This is of particular relevance where the environmental values involved are the so-called 'non-use' values that do not require any direct contact with the environment for people to enjoy a benefit. Notable amongst this class of value is the existence benefit that people enjoy from the knowledge that ecosystems or species are protected from the threat of extinction.
To estimate the values associated with the complete range of values associated with environmental flows in rivers, there is a need to go beyond revealed preference techniques. This need has been met by stated preference techniques. This type of method involves the questioning of a sample of those people who are potentially affected by a policy change regarding their preferences for the alternative outcomes. Best known of these techniques is the contingent valuation (CV) method whereby people are asked if they are willing to pay a pre-assigned amount to secure an environmental improvement or avoid some environmental harm (Mitchell and Carson 1989) . Through varying the amount of the pre-assigned cost across sub-samples of respondents, a relationship between the probability that a respondent will agree to pay and the amount of the payment can be estimated. From that relationship, mean and median willingness to pay can be estimated.
Largely because of the hypothetical nature of the payment question asked in a CV questionnaire -that is, intentions rather than actions form the empirical base -the technique has been controversial. This was demonstrated in Australia over the case of a proposal to mine Coronation Hill adjacent to Kakadu National Park (Imber 1991) and in the United States regarding the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Portney 1994 ).
The criticism of CV has lead to the steady evolution of stated preference techniques. Contingent Valuation itself has been advanced through the recognition of numerous requirements for estimates to be valid (Portney 1994 ) and other methods have developed. Prominent amongst these is choice modelling (CM) 4 .
Like CV, CM is theoretically based in the Random Utility Model (Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000) . Respondents to a CM questionnaire are asked to select their preferred option from an array of alternatives. Each alternative is described to respondents in terms of a number of 'attributes'. The alternatives are differentiated from each other by the attributes taking on different levels. The set of attributes will contain descriptors of the non-market value outcomes and a financial cost to the individual. This type of question (known as a choice set) is presented to respondents a number of times. Each choice set involves different alternatives -apart from one alternative representing the 'business as usual' case that appears in each choice set to form a base level.
By presenting respondents with a fraction of the full factorial of possible combinations of attribute levels in the sequence of choice sets, CM enables the analyst to observe the ways in which various respondents trade off between outcomes. Choices made allow the estimation of a relationship between the probability of an alternative being selected, the levels of the attributes describing the alternatives and the socio-economic characteristics of the respondent. This probabilistic relationship allows the estimation of marginal rates of substitution between the attributes. Of particular interest are the 'implicit prices' of the non-monetary attributes: the amount respondents, on average, are willing to pay to secure an increase of one unit in the non-monetary attribute, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the value of specific bundles of attributes representing the business as usual and change scenarios can be estimated and a marginal benefit of the change can be calculated.
Can it be done (well)?
With the level of technical refinement now evident in stated preference techniques, it is appropriate to ask whether the estimates now being produced are technically valid. In other words, are the estimates accurate and reliable measures of changes in social welfare? Can non-market valuation be done well?
The difficulty in answering this question is that the very nature of the value that is being estimated prevents a 'benchmarking' exercise. There is no well-defined 'right' value against which estimates can be judged. For instance, it is not appropriate to compare peoples' stated willingness to pay against what they would pay should the hypothetical situation under which the bids were made were to become real. The 'real' bids would then become prone to classic free-rider incentives of understatement. Rather what is possible is a sequence of indirect tests of validity 5 .
To provide some examples of such tests, and to demonstrate the capacity of the CM technique, an outline of a study designed to estimate the environmental values of NSW rivers is outlined below.
The environmental values of NSW rivers 6
The approach taken in this study was to investigate the environmental values provided by a sample of rivers from across NSW. For this purpose, the state was divided into five 'bio-geographic regions'. One river from within each region was selected, and the environmental values of the rivers in these 'representative' rivers were estimated in five separate CM applications.
The four attributes 7 used to describe the environmental condition of the rivers were: ! Water quality, as indicated by the suitability of the river for alternative recreational uses (riverside picnicking, boating, fishing and swimming); ! Healthy riverside vegetation and wetlands; ! Native fish species present; and ! Waterbirds and other fauna species present After consultations with river ecologists and policy advisers, regions and 'representative rivers' were selected. The rivers selected for analysis (along with their regions of location) were: ! Bega River (southern, coastal) ! Clarence River (northern, coastal) ! Georges River (urban) ! Murrumbidgee River (southern, inland) ! Gwydir River (northern, inland).
To investigate the impact on value of proximity of residence to a river, respondents were selected from populations living within and outside the river catchments. The structure of the survey sampling is shown in Table 1 . 5 Some studies (for instance, see Blamey and Bennett 2001) have sought to validate non-market valuations by comparing results against market data. To do this requires a relationship between marketed and non-marketed goods. Where no such link exists, direct validation remains problematic. 6 The results reported here are drawn from Bennett and Morrison (2001) . 7 See Bennett, Morrison and Harvey (2000) for details of the process employed to select these attributes. 
The questionnaires
Five separate questionnaires were designed around the five 'representative' rivers for the within catchment surveys. In order to ensure the comparability of results from each survey, the questionnaires used were structurally identical. Differences between the questionnaires related to divergent biophysical characteristics of the rivers only.
Maintaining the questionnaire structure across the samples enabled the statistical testing for differences between the attribute values estimated for each river and its local population. These tests enable the detection of differences in attribute values that are due to differences in the biophysical features of the rivers and socio-economic characteristics of the local residents.
The 'outside catchment' questionnaires were designed to parallel their respective 'within catchment' questionnaires. This again was to ensure comparability of results across the questionnaire versions.
The questionnaires 8 used contained several elements: ! background information about the catchment, ! a scenario description (ie explaining why people should have to pay for improving river health and what this will achieve), ! a series of choice sets to answer, and ! debrief questions.
An additional attribute was included as a means by which respondents could pay for river health improvement options. This payment vehicle was a one-off levy on water rates for all households in the catchment during 2001. An example choice set is shown in Figure 1 . 
The samples
To implement the research design, seven samples of 900 respondents were drawn from 'Australia on Disk', a listing of people based on the White Pages telephone directory. For the five 'within catchment' samples, respondents were selected at random on the basis of postcodes relating to the corresponding river catchments. For two of the catchments (Gwydir and Murrumbidgee) further samples of 900 respondents were drawn from 'outside' of these catchments across the whole state.
A four stage surveying process was employed. First, an introductory letter advising those drawn in the sample that they would shortly be receiving a questionnaire was dispatched. Those receiving the letter were given the option of withdrawal. As well as heightening the significance of the survey, this preliminary letter was designed to filter out names and/or addresses from the sample that were redundant -such as people who had moved, were incapable of answering or who were deceased. The effective sample size was reduced to account for these sample frame inadequacies. The second stage of the survey involved the mailing of the questionnaire with an accompanying letter and a reply paid envelope. A reminder card comprised the third stage and a re-mail of the questionnaire to those yet to respond completed the process 9 .
The useable response rates for the all of the surveys are shown in Table 2 . The overall response rate was 37.8%, ranging from 28.7% to 45.9%. For the within catchment samples, the response rate averaged 40%. This response rate compares favourably with other mail surveys of this genre (Mitchell and Carson 1989) . The socio-demographic characteristics of the survey samples are shown in Table 3 . # Score on a scale with boundaries: 1-never went to school and 6-tertiary degree
Modelling the data
To estimate the values of the environmental attributes, the choice data collected in the surveys were analysed using a nested logit model. In the nested logit model, a 'treestructure' of the choice process used by respondents is pre-specified. Tree structures reflect the existence of homogenous sets of choice alternatives that have correlated errors. They can have multiple levels. All of the alternatives are in the branches at the bottom of the structure. These alternatives are then grouped at the next level using the limbs of the tree. The tree represents the choice process used by respondents when deciding between alternatives. Hence, it is assumed that respondents first decide if they want to support any change in river management (ie they choose between the 'business as usual' alternative and the other options). Subsequently, if they have not 'selected business as usual' then they are assumed to choose between the 'change' alternatives on the basis of their attributes.
Following Kling and Thompson (1996) , the nested logit model can be specified as follows. The probability of a particular alternative being chosen (P jm ) is equal to the probability that the limb is chosen (P(m)) multiplied by the probability that the alternative is chosen from within the limb P(j|m). That is:
where:
I m is the inclusive value and is the sum of the utility of all of the alternatives. The model works by estimating the probability that an alternative is chosen within a limb P(j|m) and estimating the probability that a limb is chosen (P(m)).
The variables used in the nested logit models, and their expected signs, are presented in Table 4 . Note that for the socio-demographic variables, the expected signs are opposite to what would normally be expected as these variables have been interacted with the alternative specific constant (ASC) representing the continuation of the current situation option. The nested logit models are presented in Table 5 . 
Value estimates
The coefficients estimated using the nested logit model were used to derive estimates of the values of unit increases in the environmental attributes. These attribute values (implicit prices) are calculated as follows, where utility is a linear function of all attributes:
where IP is the implicit price , β A represents the coefficient of the Ath nonmonetary attribute, and β M represents the coefficient of the monetary attribute.
The attribute values so estimated are presented in Table 6 . They represent the amount, on average, that a respondent household was willing to pay to see an additional unit of each attribute achieved. 
Assessing the technique
The data collected and models estimated allow a number of tests of validity to be performed. These tests relate to assessments of the reliability and accuracy of the value estimates.
First, the strength of the statistical models that underpin the estimates provides a means of assessing the validity of the analysis. The models estimated for this study are able to explain a relatively large proportion of the total variability displayed in the raw data with the adjusted rho-squared ranging from 0.21 to 0.41 10 . That is, the models are extremely good at explaining the choice behaviour of the respondents. Secondly, the attributes used to describe the outcomes of river management strategies were consistently found to be significant in determining respondents' choices. The p values for the attribute coefficients in Table 5 are consistently below the 0.05 level. Furthermore, the direction of the relationships between attribute levels and choices were as predicted by theory. For instance, it was consistently found that river management options that were more costly were less frequently chosen by respondents whilst options providing more species of fish were chosen more frequently.
Thirdly, respondents' ages, their income and their attitudes to environmental issues had significant influences on choice behaviour and in directions that are predicted by theory. Notably, respondents with higher incomes were prepared to pay more for environmental improvements than lower income respondents.
A further factor indicating the strength of the value estimates is the strong response rates achieved in the surveys. The response rates achieved for the Bega and Clarence surveys were greater than 45 per cent, a higher rate than is generally expected from a mail-out mail-back format. Even the two poorest response rate samples (Georges and Gwydir-outside) were in excess of 25 per cent, a rate that is commonly accepted as reasonable for mail questionnaires of this level of complexity.
These tests provide some confidence in the viability of the CM technique and the reliability of the estimates it provides. However it is salutary to note that some weaknesses are evident. For instance a number of the implicit prices are not significantly different from zero without clear reason. An example of this is the value of an additional fish species in the Clarence River. All other models yielded positive and relatively consistent values for this attribute but it was insignificant for the Clarence model. Furthermore, the results of a separate but parallel exercise to estimate the value of improving river health across the whole state (rather than in a single river) demonstrated the presence of framing effects. Put simply, the value estimated for improving all the rivers of the state was less than the aggregated values of improvements in the five rivers that were studied as separate entities. The question remains how much of this framing effect is to be expected as a result of the effects of the income constraint and rivers acting as substitutes for each other and how much is 'perfect embedding'. The latter effect occurs when respondents are not responsive to the size of changes in the good that is offered in a stated preference questionnaire and is a clear breach of the behavioural axioms of the random utility model. Research into this phenomenon is on going (Rolfe, Loch and Bennett 2002) .
Should it be done
The controversy regarding the use of stated preference techniques is not limited to questions of technical capability. There is also an ethical dimension to the issue. Some regard the concept of assigning monetary values to environmental impacts as immoral (Sagoff 1988) . The notion prevails that environmental values are held on a different plane and should not be compared with values that are exchanged in markets.
The question of comparability of environmental values with the values of marketed goods and services can be addressed without recourse to ethical argument. It is clear from casual observation of the ways in which people behave that trade-offs between monetary and non-monetary considerations are made by everyone. By driving cars, switching on lights, flushing the toilet, buying phosphate-free laundry detergent or subscribing to 'green' power schemes, etc, we all make decisions that impact on the environment. In making those decisions we implicitly decide that the values to us of transportation, power and sanitation are worth the environmental damage we cause through our actions. We may not explicitly estimate a value for the marginal benefits and costs involved but we still make choices that trade-off market and non-market values.
Similarly, as a society, we make decisions that implicitly involve comparisons between market and non-market benefits and costs. For instance when a government decides to allow logging in a forest rather than declaring it a nature reserve, there is an implicit determination that the forest's nature protection benefits are worth less than the monetary surpluses generated from logging. If the environment did hold trump status over marketed values, its difficult to imagine how humanity could justify its own existence, if the definition of what is 'natural' excludes human influence.
Hence, the only real question facing society is not whether the valuation of nonmarketed, environmental impacts in monetary terms should be done but rather whether it should be done explicitly or implicitly. Transparency of the decisionmaking processes and the avoidance of rent seeking require explicit valuation.
Will it be done (regularly)?
It has been argued that, technically, the results of CM applications undertaken in a rigorous fashion are capable of delivering estimates of non-market values that can be defended as valid. Furthermore, the ethical concerns about the process are largely unfounded. Hence, these factors should not be regarded as barriers to the use of stated preference techniques as sources of information on matters such as the allocation of environmental flows in rivers. The question remaining is whether or not the removal, or at least lowering, of these barriers can be expected to increase the regularity with which stated preference techniques are employed.
A number of factors support a negative response to this question and they all concern issues of rent seeking. For instance, would one expect the vested interest groups in the environmental flows debate to support the call for strict benefit cost analysis of alternative strategies including the estimation of environmental values? This is unlikely because there is a risk that such an analysis would deliver a finding that the specific option a vested interest group is supporting for personal benefit would not be in the best interests of the broader society. Without the information, the vested interest groups can present vague and possibly emotive arguments to support their case and to detract from their opponent's case.
Similarly, it is unlikely that the politician decision-makers would support transparency. The better informed the public is on the pros and cons of alternatives, the less likely a politician would be able to introduce a policy alternative that meets rent seekers' demands and hence provides political survival. Allowing the collection and collation of more information on relative benefits and costs may be seen by politicians as an effective loss of power.
Ways forward
There are however some potential sources of support for non-market valuation specifically and benefit cost analysis more generally. First, there are always competitors for public funding. If one vested interest group is consistently successful in securing rents in the absence of explicit value estimates, groups who are also seeking funding may feel that their quests would be more successful if they were based on explicit value estimates. One such group may be the agricultural sector. Whilst a cooperative arrangement was struck between the Australian Conservation Foundation and the National Farmers' Federation to institute the decade of Landcare and the two versions of the Natural Heritage Trust, it would seem unlikely that the affiliation could continue beyond some threshold level of conservation. For instance, efforts by conservation groups to quarantine more native vegetation from agricultural production and to allocate more water away from irrigation are points of obvious conflict. Either side of the debate may feel that its efforts would be more effective with recourse to benefit cost analysis including estimates of the non-market values.
There may also be pressure from the tax-paying public to require greater scrutiny of public policy in natural resource management. As ex-post information regarding inefficiencies becomes available to the general public, more people may seek increased rigor in the determination of policy. A movement in this direction followed the review of the first round of the Natural Heritage Trust which found that little by way of landscape outcomes had been achieved (Bardsley, Chaudhri, Stoneham and Strappazzon 2002) . The criticism focused on the thin spread of the projects funded. Subsequently, the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality has been designed to focus on a restricted number of catchments. Unfortunately, the selection of these catchments was not based on any formal assessment of relative benefits and costs. Furthermore, the inefficiency of the first round of the Natural Heritage Trust is being addressed (admittedly to only a very minor degree) through the introduction of market based instruments as natural resource management policy mechanisms. Again, it is unfortunate that the parameters defining the extent of these policies (such as the total amount of funding to be allocated) have not been defined with reference to net social benefit. So whilst progress has been made, there is still some distance to travel.
Finally, it must be recognised that policy makers will often face competing rent seekers where no clear-cut political decision is apparent. For instance, the number of seats to be gained or lost from a decision may be approximately the same whichever option is chosen. In such circumstances, politicians may decide to fall back on 'independent' advice that could include non-market value estimates as part of a benefit cost analysis of the alternatives. By adopting this strategy, politicians may hope to escape some of the negative electoral consequences of a decision.
If more non-market valuation exercises are undertaken, the opportunities should be taken to expand the body of knowledge regarding the techniques. In other words, there is still a lot to be learnt about the techniques and an active research agenda should be pursued. One avenue for this is the use of the benefit transfer process.
Where time or resource constraints limit the application of non-market valuation techniques, estimates of values may be transferred from other already completed valuation exercises. Significant caveats are attached to this process. Contextual similarities must prevail between the 'source' and 'target' sites. These relate to the biophysical attributes of the sites, the socio-economic characteristics of the populations affected and the magnitude of the changes involved. Clearly, the number and variety of valuation studies already performed -the pool of 'source' studies -is important in determining how likely it is that an existing application suited for transfer is available. So whilst benefit transfer offers the promise of affordable inclusion of non-market value estimates, it also requires a significant capital investment in the establishment of an adequate data-base of studies. Furthermore, that data-base will require on-going supplementation to ensure that the temporal context of studies (associated for instance with changing community preferences over time) is maintained and that advances in methodologies are also incorporated.
So whilst significant progress has been achieved in the development of the techniques that can aid with the incorporation of non-market values into the process of developing water policy, there are still avenues of further research that call for additional work. It is important to acknowledge the role of critical appraisal of the techniques of non-market valuation in their past and future development. Much of the research impetus in the field has come from the often strident criticism that has been leveled at non-market valuation.
